

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 11441

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS:PARM
SUBJECT: MINISTER SEMENOV'S PLENARY STATEMENT
DECEMBER 1, 1977 (SALT TWO-1524)

BEGIN TEXT.

- SEMENOV STATEMENT, DECEMBER 1, 1977

- I

IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS THE SIDES
HAVE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL THE QUESTION OF LIMITATIONS ON
CRUISE MISSILES, BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER ARTICLE III OF
THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY. AS YOU KNOW, AT THE NOVEM-
BER 9, 1977 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION TABLED THE PRO-
POSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE FOR THIS PROVISION OF THE DRAFT
BEING NEGOTIATED, WHICH PRODUCED PROGRESS IN REACHING
AGREEMENT ON THE JOINT FORMULATIONS ON THIS SCORE.

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TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS
HELD HERE AND WITH A VIEW TO CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRESS IN
REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE ENTIRE DRAFT BEING WORKED OUT,
THE USSR DELEGATION PROPOSES THAT ARTICLE III OF THE PRO-
TOCOL TO THE TREATY BE AGREED UPON IN THE FOLLOWING
WORDING:

- "ARTICLE III OF THE PROTOCOL

1. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO FLIGHT-TEST OR
DEPLOY CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF
2,500 KILOMETERS.

2. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO DEPLOY CRUISE MIS-
SILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS ON
SEA-BASED LAUNCHERS OR LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS."

DURING THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON LIMITING LONG-RANGE
CRUISE MISSILES THE QUESTION OF WORKING OUT A DEFINITION
OF SUCH MISSILES WAS ALSO ADDRESSED HERE. THE SOVIET
SIDE BELIEVES THAT THE PURPOSE OF DEFINING CRUISE MISSILES
IS TO ENSURE A PRECISE UNDERSTANDING BY THE SIDES OF THE
OBLIGATIONS BEING ASSUMED, AND STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH
THESE OBLIGATIONS, VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED
HERE IN THIS CONNECTION, THE USSR DELEGATION IS TABLING
A PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE A DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILES IN
THE FOLLOWING WORDING AS PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE II:

- "PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE II OF THE TREATY

CRUISE MISSILES ARE ANY SELF-PROPELLED, GUIDED
MISSILES WHICH SUSTAIN MOST OF THEIR FLIGHT THROUGH THE
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USE OF AERODYNAMIC LIFT."

HAVING STUDIED THE QUESTION OF WORKING OUT A DEFINI-
TION OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE, THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES
IT NECESSARY THAT THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED THEREIN BE
SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR AND FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE SUB-
STANCE OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED IN THIS AREA.
IT IS OBVIOUS THAT A DIFFERENT APPROACH, BASED, FOR
EXAMPLE, ON USING AS A CRITERION THE ARBITRARILY INTER-
PRETED SO-CALLED "OPERATIONAL" RANGE OF A CRUISE MISSILE,
INJECTS ELEMENTS OF SUBJECTIVITY AND VAGUENESS, AND
LEADS TO WEAKENING AND ERODING THE LIMITATIONS ON LONG-
RANGE CRUISE MISSILES.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES A DRAFT AGREED STATEMENT
TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 6, IN THE FOLLOWING WORDING:

-"AGREED STATEMENT TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE II OF THE
- TREATY

THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THE RANGE CAPABILITY OF A
CRUISE MISSILE IS THE MAXIMUM DISTANCE THE MISSILE CAN

FLY IN A STRAIGHT LINE IN ITS STANDARD DESIGN MODE."

THIS PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE ESTABLISHES UNAMBIGUOUS CRITERIA FOR DEFINING THE RANGE OF CRUISE MISSILES AND IS IN ACCORD WITH THE TASK OF PROVIDING FOR EFFECTIVE AND STRICT LIMITATIONS ON SUCH MISSILES.

- II

IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, IN THE

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CONTEXT OF CONSIDERING LIMITATIONS ON LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES, A QUESTION AROSE TO WHICH THE USSR DELEGATION, PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS, INTENDS TO DRAW THE PARTICULAR ATTENTION OF THE U.S. SIDE.

IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT WE PROVIDE FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF SUB-DIVIDING LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES INTO NUCLEAR-ARMED AND NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED MISSILES AND ON THIS BASIS MODIFY THE OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING LIMITATIONS ON CRUISE MISSILES, WHICH HAVE BEEN AGREED BY THE SIDES.

THE SOVIET SIDE'S POSITION OF PRINCIPLE ON THIS SCORE WAS SET FORTH AT THE MEETINGS OF OCTOBER 27 AND NOVEMBER 3 AND 9, 1977. IT WAS STATED THAT AN APPROACH UNDER WHICH THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE VIII OF THE TREATY COULD BE ALTERED UPON EXPIRATION OF THE PROTOCOL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE EXISTING

UNDERSTANDING AND IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. THE RATIONALE HAS BEEN PRESENTED.

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TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION HAS TO STATE THE FOLLOWING IN ADDITION.

THE OBLIGATIONS BEING WORKED OUT FOR ARTICLE VIII OF THE TREATY, LIKE THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT, WILL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE XX, REMAIN IN FORCE THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1985. THUS, THE SIDES UNDERTAKE FOR THE ENTIRE TERM OF THE TREATY NOT TO EQUIP AIRCRAFT, OTHER THAN HEAVY BOMBERS AS DEFINED IN ARTICLE II, PAR. 3, OF THE TREATY WITH CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS AND NOT TO TEST SUCH MISSILES FROM THESE SYSTEMS. THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE TREATY DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ANY KIND OF DIVISION OF CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS INTO NUCLEAR-ARMED AND CONVENTIONALLY-ARMED MISSILES. THIS, IN ESSENCE, IS ALSO IMPLIED IN THE WORDING OF THE DRAFT OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE TREATY, TABLED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION, AND ALSO, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, IN THE U.S. DELEGATION'S APPROACH TO COUNTING, UNDER THE TREATY, BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS WITHIN THE 1,320 AGGREGATE NUMBER.

THUS, ALL CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS ARE SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER THE TREATY. TO ALLOW FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTERING THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER ARTICLE VIII OF THE TREATY WOULD BE NOTHING LESS THAN AN ATTEMPT TO UPSET THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES AND TO SUPPLANT THE OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING LIMITATIONS ON CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS, OPENING THE WAY FOR AN UNCHECKED BUILDUP OF THIS NEW KIND OF
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STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON ALONG NEW CHANNELS AND IN NEW DIRECTIONS.

SUCH A TURN OF EVENTS WOULD BE CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

THE USSR DELEGATION IS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO STATE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CATEGORICALLY REJECTS A PROVISION ENVISAGING DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE LIMITATION OF CRUISE MISSILES WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND WITH SO-CALLED CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS AS INCONSISTENT WITH AN EXISTING UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES AND ABSOLUTELY UNACCEPTABLE.

- III

AT TODAY'S MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION ALSO INTENDS TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL--REGARDING A BAN ON NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS.

THE SIDES HAVE RECENTLY GIVEN MUCH ATTENTION TO DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION. ESTABLISHMENT OF EFFECTIVE AND MEANINGFUL LIMITATIONS IN THE AREA UNDER CONSIDERATION IS TO BE A MAJOR STEP IN THE PROCESS OF CURBING THE ARMS RACE, STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC STABILITY AND REDUCING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR.

THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL AND, CONSEQUENTLY, INTENDED FOR A THREE-YEAR TERM MUST BE FULLY BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, WHICH IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, AND MUST NOT UPSET THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS OF THE SIDES IN THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

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IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE APPROACH WHICH IS BEING ADVANCED HERE IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL, BUT WHICH IN FACT DIRECTLY AFFECTS THE RIGHT OF THE SIDES TO MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER ARTICLE X OF THE TREATY, WHICH IS AGREED.

THIS IS EXPRESSED IN THE DEFINITIONS PROPOSED HERE FOR THE TERMS "NEW TYPES OF ICBMS" AND "NEW TYPES OF SLBMS" IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL. AS A CRITERION INDICATING THAT A NEW TYPE OF ICBM AND

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SLBM IS MEANT, THEY USE CHANGES IN CERTAIN MISSILE COMPONENTS OR IN THE COMBINATION OF SUCH COMPONENTS. IN ESSENCE, UNDER THE PRETEXT OF CLARIFYING THE OBLIGATION BEING ASSUMED BY THE SIDES TO BAN NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS, THE CRITERION REFERRED TO IS AIMED AT BANNING MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH ENSUE FROM NORMAL TECHNOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS AND ARE PERMITTED BY ARTICLE X OF THE TREATY.

THUS, USING A CRITERION BASED ON MISSILE COMPONENTS OR COMBINATIONS THEREOF IN THE DEFINITION IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL WOULD LEAD TO SUPPLANTING THE SUBJECT OF THE BAN UNDER THIS PROVISION OF THE DOCUMENT BEING NEGOTIATED. INSTEAD OF BANNING NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS, AS DISCUSSED AT THE SOVIET-U.S. TALKS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN WASHINGTON IN THE LATTER PART OF SEPTEMBER, SUCH PROPOSALS FOR THIS ARTICLE OF THE PROTOCOL PROVIDE FOR SOMETHING COMPLETELY DIFFERENT, NAMELY, FOR BANNING MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS.

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AN APPROACH BASED ON MISSILE COMPONENTS INCLUDES AN ATTEMPT TO BLUR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING ICBMS AND SLBMS, PERMITTED UNDER THE TREATY,

AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF SUCH MISSILES. IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS WOULD OPEN UP THE POSSIBILITY OF ARBITRARILY INCLUDING AMONG BANNED NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS THE EXISTING TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS THE SIDES HAVE, WHICH ARE BEING MODERNIZED CONSISTENT WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY BEING WORKED OUT.

THUS, IN THE CONTEXT WE ARE DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF MISSILE COMPONENTS HAS NO REAL BEARING ON THE SUBJECT OR SCOPE OF THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL. MOREOVER, IF ONE LOOKS AT THE ACTUAL DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE RELEVANT AREA, AN APPROACH OF THIS KIND WOULD IN FACT LEAD TO DEVIATING FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY AND WOULD LEAD TO ACQUIRING A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

AT THE NOVEMBER 29, 1977 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION, GUIDED BY THE INTERESTS OF REACHING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING, SET FORTH NEW PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE FOR ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL. THE PROPOSALS WE TABLED TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED IN THE COURSE OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO WORKING OUT A DEFINITION OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS, TO BE BANNED UNDER ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL.

THE SOVIET SIDE'S PROPOSAL TO THE EFFECT THAT NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS OR SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLES INCLUDE ALL TYPES OF SUCH ICBMS AND SLBMS, THE FLIGHT-TESTING OF WHICH WAS INITIATED AFTER
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1976, GIVES THE SIDES A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SCOPE OF THE OBLIGATIONS THEY ARE ASSUMING WITH RESPECT TO BANNING SUCH TYPES OF MISSILES FOR THE TERM OF THE PROTOCOL. THE CRITERION INCORPORATED IN THE SOVIET SIDE'S PROPOSAL, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE RELEVANT ALREADY AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT, IN PARTICULAR, THOSE OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 5, OF THE TREATY, MAKES IT FULLY POSSIBLE FOR THE SIDES TO HAVE, AS A RESULT OF OBSERVATIONS CARRIED OUT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, AN ACCURATE PICTURE OF WHICH TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE BAN UNDER ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL.

IN THIS CONNECTION, THE APPROACH ADVANCED HERE BY THE SOVIET SIDE, BEING STRICTLY IN ACCORD WITH THE SUBJECT OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER THIS ARTICLE OF THE PROTOCOL AND WITHOUT INTRODUCING EXTRA-NEOUS ELEMENTS, DOES NOT AFFECT MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY.

AS ALREADY NOTED HERE, IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE SOVIET SIDE FOR ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL, IN OUR VIEW, BROAD AREAS OF COINCIDENCE OR PROXIMITY OF VIEWS ON THIS RANGE OF QUESTIONS ARE EMERGING.

AS FOR THE QUESTION OF MODERNIZATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH WAS ADDRESSED HERE IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS, IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT IN THIS REGARD THE TREATY BEING WORKED OUT PROVIDES FOR QUITE DEFINITE LIMITATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES. YOU KNOW WHAT THEY ARE.

NEW MEASURES IN THIS AREA WILL BECOME THE SUBJECT OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC

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OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH--IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING--WILL BEGIN IN 1978, PROMPTLY AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY BEING WORKED OUT.

THUS, CONSISTENT AND TIMELY MOVEMENT BY THE SIDES TOWARD ASSUMPTION OF EVEN MORE FAR-REACHING OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS ENVISAGED IN THIS AREA AS WELL.

THE USSR DELEGATION PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE CONSIDERATIONS WE HAVE SET FORTH TODAY WITH RESPECT TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL WILL BE CAREFULLY STUDIED BY THE U.S. SIDE.
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